14sept/160

Le service de veille DigiWorld Research

Gassot-Yves

Yves Gassot,
Directeur général, IDATE DigiWorld
Contacter

Comment suivre les transformations rapides de nos industries sans être étouffé par l’avalanche des news nous annonçant tous les jours la disruption fondamentale ? Plus prosaïquement, comment amorcer la réflexion sur un projet ou un marché en disposant de chiffres de référence, d’un benchmark, et d’une première analyse indépendante ?

 

L’IDATE a vocation à fournir grâce à ses équipes de consultants et analystes hautement spécialisés  un ensemble de services de veille sur les marchés des télécommunications, de l’Internet et des médias.

Permettez-moi dans cet éditorial de souligner l’intérêt de cette offre en retenant trois études sur des sujets pertinents et d’actualité, publiées cet été par nos équipes :

• Quelle importance doit-on accorder aux expériences ou aux premières offres de LTE visant la fourniture de services fixes ?  On trouvera dans l’étude que vient de publier Carole Manero  (« LTE for fixed access : the next big thing ? »)  les facteurs qui rendent cette perspective plus crédible après les échecs du LMDS et du WiMax… mais aussi dans un contexte où l’on a vu récemment Google annoncer qu’il pourrait limiter ses investissements aux Etats-Unis dans les projets Google Fiber au profit de solutions radios et AT&T et Verizon, qui n’ont pas un statut d’opérateur national dans les accès filaires, déployer des offres wireless fixes en LTE ou même en 5G dans le cadre de leurs premiers tests.

Le sport, dernier bastion de la TV linéaire ?  Florence Le Borgne cherche à répondre à cette question dans son rapport « Contenus sportifs : TV vs. OTT » en analysant dans l’inflation des droits sportifs ce qui résulte de la concurrence entre les chaînes, de la concurrence de la VoD et des ambitions des géants de l’Internet.

• Faut-il tabler sur la fin de la consolidation des télécoms en Europe ? Dans son rapport (« Telecom consolidation in Europe: toward new challenges ? »), Christoph Pennings revient sur les opérations in-market de ces dernières années,  et aborde la nouvelle donne résultant des opérations de convergence (notamment fixe-mobile) mais aussi résultant de l’inflexion de la politique de Bruxelles.

J’aurais pu retenir d’autres rapports en cours de finalisation sur l’IoT, l’industrie 4.0, la nouvelle génération de satellites LEO, la blockchain, ou les déploiements du FTTH dans le monde… Consultez le site de l’IDATE pour en savoir plus siur ces études et notre catalogue, , n’hésitez pas à vous adresser à nos responsables commerciaux (j.george@idate.org) ou aux consultants que j’ai pu citer.

PS -"Yves Stourdzé, explorateur et éclaireur des mondes à venir" : Certains parmi vous ont peut-être noté que le siège de l’IDATE est sis « allée Yves Stourdzé ». Yves, universitaire brillant, nommé Directeur du Centre d’étude des systèmes et technologies avancées (CESTA) à sa création en 1982 par François Mitterand, a été non seulement l'inspirateur du programme Eureka, mais aussi un de ceux qui ont cru au développement de l’IDATE et soutenu ses premiers pas. A la suite du colloque qui s’est tenu à Paris au Ministère de la Recherche sur ses travaux, je vous engage à vous procurer l’ouvrage « Yves Stourdzé, explorateur et éclaireur des mondes à venir » réunissant à travers 25 contributions de personnalités des témoignages et des analyses. Par ailleurs, aux mêmes éditions (Sens & Tonka, www.sens-tonka.net ) vous pourrez prochainement à l’occasion d’une nouvelle parution retrouver les principaux ouvrages d’Yves Stourdzé.

Pour suivre l’actualité de l’économie numérique, n’oubliez pas de vous inscrire à notre newsletter

13sept/160

LTE has gone mainstream: 1 billion subscriber mark exceeded at year-end 2015

MANERO-Carole

Carole Manero
Director of Studies, IDATE DigiWorld Contact

Fixed LTE will be definitly part of the game: by the end of 2020 we forecast, overall, almost 5 billion LTE SIMs worldwide or 78% of total SIMs.

 

The fixed-mobile convergence has been trending for years. The opportunity to use LTE and its evolutions as a solution for providing high-speed Internet access at fixed locations has raised generated much interest in the last two to three years.

The use of LTE for fixed access makes sense. The elements to make adoption possible are there. Throughputs delivered over LTE are on par with fixed ones or are expected to be on par in the medium term. Population coverage is almost universal and will continue to increase to cover hard-to-reach areas. LTE fixed monetisation without any data caps is another valuable asset. All the lights will be on green when coverage reaches rural areas thanks to low spectrum use or to government push.

On the technological side, fixed LTE holds many virtues over WiMAX, satellite, mobile LTE or XGP/AXGP technologies even if there are no real specificities to fixed LTE when it comes to standard.

• Fixed LTE networks are basically just LTE networks addressing fixed users. Fixed LTE retains mobile LTE advantages in terms of throughputs/capacity and latency. Population coverage is likely to remain a weakness. It is not really a different technology from mobile LTE but it is to be implemented in very different ways when it is provided as a fixed-only technology or as a complement to a mobile network. Other fixed LTE advantages include:

• Higher power emission levels than for mobile LTE leading to improved signal quality.

• Mobile LTE is mostly operated on FDD mode and on TDD for fixed LTE. Fixed LTE could be mostly operated on TDD mode which is better suited for providing Internet access than FDD. Higher frequencies considered for fixed TDD LTE notably in 3.5 GHz, 2.3 GHz and 1.4 GHz bands or in very high frequencies necessitate heavy deployment of small cells for blind-spots coverage and the use of satellite to handle tightened backhaul issues.

• Hybrid solutions combining xDSL and LTE show similar strengths to fixed LTE with slightly higher latency. They are gaining traction with some commercial launches in Europe.

• Satellite and especially new LEO satellite constellations can likely offset the relative weakness of fixed LTE in terms of population coverage.

Favourable market dynamics have pushed a number of players to jump onto the bandwagon. They aim at either enlarging their customer base, giving a boost to revenues (MNOs, integrated players, satellite), or taking a chance to remain a market disruptor and eating into mobile revenues (OTT), or at repositioning themselves in case of an upturn (LMDS players, PHS or WiMAX providers and CDMA2000 450 MHz players). CDMA2000 players are migrating towards LTE in the 450 MHz band. Former PHS (Japan) or WiMAX providers also see real opportunities in shifting towards fixed LTE. Manufacturers offer fixed LTE solutions to meet market demand and help operators close the gap between investment and returns.

From a commercial perspective, the door is open for fixed LTE as a mid-term solution whose business case however is rather limited in developed countries, mainly focused on connecting the un- or under-connected in rural areas. In developing countries where fixed broadband is really limited, the market for fixed LTE is more promising.

Discover the perspectives,  key trends, and scenarios about "LTE for fixed access" and contact Carole Manero for further information.

Subscribe to our newsletter and keep up to date with events and latest news.

Remplis sous: LTE Aucun commentaire
13sept/160

Digital Innovation & Finance Transformation, Interview with Jean-Hervé LORENZI

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"Digital Innovation & Finance Transformation"
DigiWorld Economic Journal n°103

Interview with Jean-Hervé LORENZI
Chairman of the Pole of Competitiveness "Finance Innovation"

Conducted by Yves GASSOT CEO IDATE DigiWorld and Maximilien NAYARADOU, Director of R&D projects,
Pôle de Compétivité Mondial Finance Innovation

 

 

DW Economic Journal: Finance vs. FinTech, where are we seeing innovation today?

Jean-Hervé LORENZI: Without a doubt, it is new entrants in what is commonly referred to as FinTech that are driving innovation today. FinTech start-ups are the myriad micro, small and medium businesses that combine information technologies and finance, and are coming to disrupt a sector that has long been protected by regulation. FinTech innovations range from new payment systems that make it possible to decrease the cost of digital transactions, to new financing platforms: crowdfunding of course, but also seed capital, stocks, robo-advisors that digitise financial consulting, blockchains that lower the cost of certifying transactions by decentralising the process, and of course the plethora of digital services that FinTech companies are ushering in: account aggregation, generating coupons based on individual shopping habits, etc. Added to this are the myriad possibilities opened up by big data: extra-financial analysis that, at last, selects financially-relevant variables and helps expand the range of enterprises that have access to financing.

But it should also be said that, even if FinTechs have the momentum on their side, traditional finance industry players are also innovating, albeit at a slower pace: the pace of private bureaucracies and as a defensive measure, but innovating nonetheless. Regulatory pressure is stepping up, and it seems safe to predict that the rate of innovation inside banks and insurance companies will accelerate… naturally with the help of FinTechs.

The Finance Innovation competition cluster, of which I am the president, is at the very heart of these changes in the financial sector. Twice a year, we give our seal of approval to 50 innovative projects, most of which are FinTech projects, and so coming from micro, small and medium businesses, but we also give our seal to projects from the sector's larger enterprises that are seeking to promote new products that are innovative, strategic and reliable. Lastly, we extend our seal to collaborative projects driven by FinTechs, large corporations and academics, projects eligible for public subsidies aimed at encouraging players to work together to innovate. The Finance Innovation competition cluster is the only structure in France that centralises finance-related innovations of all kinds – technological or service-centric – and regardless of the entity behind the endeavour: FinTechs of course, but also large corporations and academics.

What are the different views on competition between FinTech companies and veteran market players? Is FinTech not synonymous with disintermediation?

Veteran players have their own set of assets, including their market power and immense size, especially in France, which enable economies of scale and create real barriers to entry. FinTechs are small and in some cases tiny companies. But veteran players' strengths are also their weaknesses: their large size also means a heavy bureaucracy that paralyses initiative and agility.

We should also point out that, when competing with incumbents, FinTechs have the prevailing wind of financial disintermediation in their sails. Of course, these are two separate phenomena, but they do feed and foster one another. The high-speed digitisation of the financial sector is helping to bring down market entry costs for newcomers, and the cost of disintermediation. Disintermediation allows assets managers and insurance companies to finance companies directly, without having to go through the banks, and allows crowd-funders to do the same. Disintermediation opens up the market for FinTechs, digitisation makes it possible to roll out a solvent product with very little capital, contrary to insurance companies and assets managers. FinTechs are also entering the realm of shadow banking, this non-banking form of finance that is developing and, when properly regulated, contributing to funding the economy: crowdfunding, seed capital platforms and online factoring are all part of the shadow banking phenomenon.

Does Europe lag behind in the area of FinTech and innovative financial solutions? What differences do you see between the situation in France and Europe from the one in the United States or in Asia?

It is not Europe that is lagging behind, but rather the Eurozone. The United Kingdom is absolutely not lagging behind: prior to the Brexit vote, London was Europe's FinTech capital. Compared to the US and even the UK, fundraising levels in France are still quite meagre, despite a significant increase in both frequency and volume since the end of 2014: €1.2 million on average, compared to €5 million in the UK and well over that in the US. Of course, this can be explained by the very limited development of investment capital in France, compared to English-speaking countries.

Next, government intervention in start-ups and innovative companies is very efficient: in the US and the UK, the public sector takes far more risks of losing money and in financing businesses with little or no funds of their own, so public subsidies have a far greater impact there than in France. Added to which Anglo-Saxon governments and regulatory authorities are very FinTech-friendly: the Bank of England has an office dedicated to FinTechs which helps remove the regulatory barriers to their entry into the market. A FinTech bureau was created in France as well, but several years after the one in Britain. Another very important example is that the UK equivalent of BPI France (France's public investment bank) has financed crowdfunding platforms so that they might distribute funding to SMBs, which gave the sector an enormous boost. Plus, in both the US and the UK, relations between SMBs, large corporations and the State are regulated, and a percentage of the federal government's (under the Small Business Act in the US) and big businesses' procurements must be from small businesses, which guarantees a minimum set of opportunities for start-ups. In the financial sector, the banks thus have a very practical incentive to work with start-ups. The positive and pragmatic ecosystem that we find in English-speaking countries made investments in FinTechs profitable much more quickly, so investors were quicker to invest heavily, which helped perpetuate a virtuous circle.

We should nevertheless point out that, inside the Eurozone, France in general (thanks French Tech) and the Paris exchange in particular, are in an especially strong position with respect to FinTech, compared to Germany or Italy. For instance, France has had crowdfunding legislation in place since 2014, which provides the sector with a secure framework and is allowing it to develop in a healthy, controlled fashion, which is not the case in the other major Eurozone nations. Moreover, France and the Paris exchange in particular have a sizeable advance in terms of R&D; France is a global leader in the areas of Big Data (France was the birthplace of data mining, Big Data's predecessor, back in the 1970s) and of artificial intelligence. Not only do France and the Paris exchange have considerable R&D assets, but France in general and the Paris region have a concentration of FinTech entrepreneurs, and a tremendous intensity of entrepreneurial creativity. Lastly, listings on the Paris exchange include the largest banks, assets managers and insurance companies in Europe. If they are quick to embrace the digital transition and learn to work with FinTechs, the Paris exchange will have all the assets needed to catch up to London.

Is banking and financial regulation an impediment to FinTech's development in France? And, looking at it from another angle, could FinTech weaken a financial system that public authorities and market players have been working to strengthen since 2008?

Regulation in France, which is very strict when it comes to protecting investors and consumers, increases the cost of entering the market and, as a result, favours incumbents. It took several years for France's financial market regulators, ACPR and AMF to decide to open up a dedicated FinTech office. Added to which, once open, the FinTech bureau did not follow the more FinTech-friendly sandbox approach taken by regulators in English-speaking countries. The sandbox approach consists of relaxing regulation temporarily to be able to test the relevance of a given innovation and, at the same time, of existing regulation. France's FinTech regulator refused the sandbox approach, which means that FinTechs are not exempt from existing regulations, even when testing new products.

FinTechs are still too small to upset the balance of the financial system, but we can also point out that it is the Base III, Solvency II, MIFID et. al regulations introduced since 2008 that enable FinTechs to emerge as alternatives for the financial sector's clientele. The capital constraints that have been mandatory since 2008, and which limit the banks' leverage, have paved the way for solutions such as peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding to develop.

What scenario does the prospect of no more cheques and especially no more cash evoke for you?

This, in fact, means the end of paper money, since blockchain technology allows us to imagine the existence of digital cash, in other words a digital currency but one that is anonymous and traceable like cash. Bitcoin is to some extent a form of digital cash, but it carries the baggage of a bad reputation due to its use on the Dark Net (i.e. non public corner of the Web). There will always be a demand for a portion of transactions to remain anonymous, without implying criminal activity. When central banks start to use blockchain, digital sovereign currencies will emerge, which will be a sort of pegged exchange rate Bitcoin, like all sovereign currencies, but which would be tied to a central bank.

Can you tell us a bit about the Finance Innovation competition cluster? And what the cluster believes are the key issues facing financial market innovation today?

The Finance Innovation cluster has over 350 members: FinTechs, major banks, insurance companies and assets management companies, as well as academics, working together to disseminate a culture of innovation within the financial sector, and to accelerate the development of innovative projects in the sector that take on economic, societal and environmental issues, in the service of growth and job creation.

Finance Innovation holds two seal of approval ceremonies a year, recognising innovative FinTech start-up projects – although not confined to start-ups as the seal can also be awarded to innovative projects from large corporations in the sector, as well as collaborative projects between corporations and academia. A total of around 100 projects are awarded the seal of approval each year, through these two ceremonies. The goal is to obtain private (private fundraising) or public financing (BPI France, regional financing, innovation clusters for the trades (PIA), Single inter-ministry fund (FUI)….) and to promote innovative solutions through the cluster's YouTube channel, publishing articles on Hello Finance, use of social media, etc.

The Finance Innovation cluster is also synonymous with experimenting, testing, disseminating and promoting innovative financing solutions for micro, small and medium businesses, within the sector itself across the whole of France, and in other sectors through 70 other competition clusters.

Lastly, the Finance Innovation cluster means roadmaps for finance industry innovation. To establish these roadmaps, which are published in the form of White Papers, we work in concert with large corporations, FinTech start-ups and academics to determine which areas of innovation are priorities, and to identify future catalysts of growth. These White Papers allow us to structure innovation in our domains of expertise, and to provide the State with tools for selecting the innovative projects to subsidise. In 2016, we are publishing a White Paper on innovation in retail banking, which will be followed by two more in 2017: one on innovation in the accounting and consulting professions, and one on innovation in e-health and prevention.

Innovation in the finance industry today is coming from FinTech, in other words from technologies that are enabling the creation of new innovative and high value-added services. And let us not forget that FinTech also encompasses InsurTech, which adds connected objects, on-board systems and security issues to the mix. It is this entirely new framework that is revamping the insurance sector, as new data are available and challenging actuaries' classic risk models. The public at large tends to focus more on FinTech and the banking sector even though, thanks to InsurTech, the insurance sector is in the throes of an equally dramatic upheaval.

What do economists believe are the real stakes of the financial sector's digital transformation, in terms of economies' competitiveness, growth and job creation?

English-speaking countries have fully embraced FinTech: a shift that will allow the sector to enjoy gains in productivity, and create economies that are more competitive in terms of financing. FinTechs expand the range of what can be financed, which is something that States and the sector's regulators need to understand. On the other hand, we should not have any illusions: the prospects for job creation are strong, but so are the prospects for job destruction. Thanks to the use of digital technology, FinTechs will enjoy enormous productivity gains: over the long term, thousands of back-office jobs in banks, teller jobs and financial consultant jobs will be destroyed. The banking sector is tomorrow's steel industry. We find the classic dilemma of Schumpeterian creative destruction: a great many jobs will be lost and a great many created, but which will outnumber the other? The jobs that will be lost will be low skilled ones, while the ones that will be created will be jobs for the highly skilled: engineers, doctors, data scientists… This could further exacerbate inequalities: unskilled workers will have trouble finding a new job in the digital economy. So, to meet the challenges in terms of training, upgrading skills and making the transition to the digital economy, substantially more public monies will need to be invested in these areas to limit the negative impact of increased inequality, and the difficulties of vocational reconversion for the least skilled workers.

 

Jean-Hervé LORENZI, Major at the Agrégation des facultés de droit et sciences economies (Faculties of Law and Economics) in 1975, is Chairman of the Cercle des économistes (the famous circle of French economists), holder of the Chair "Demographic Transition, Economic Transition within the Fondation du Risque (Foundation of the Risk)" and Chairman of the Pôle de Compétitivité (Pole of Competitiveness) "Finance Innovation". He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Edmond de Rothschild France Group, of the supervisory board of Euler Hermes and the Boards of directors (board meetings) of the Médéric Alzheimer Foundation, the IDATE and the BNP Paribas Cardif. He was Professor at the university Paris-Dauphine and the member of council of economic analysis. He has notably published: Un monde de violences. L'économie mondiale 2015-2030, Paris, Eyrolles, 2014; Rajeunissement et vieillissement de la France (with J. Pelletan and A. Villemeur), Paris, Descartes & Cie, 2012; Droite contre gauche, (with O. Pastré), Paris, Fayard, 2012; Le fabuleux destin d'une puissance intermédiaire, Paris, Grasset, 2011; Le choc des populations: guerre ou paix, (in collaboration with P. Dockès), Paris, Fayard, 2010.

 

 More information on DigiWorld Economic Journal No. 103 "Digital Innovation & Finance Transformation" on our website

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13sept/160

European telecoms consolidation in a context of a modest 0.1% recovery

PENNINGS_Christoph_NB

Christoph Pennings
Director of Studies, IDATE DigiWorld Contact

European telecom services market (nearly +€300m YoY 2016/2015) seems bound for a modest recovery after revenues had fallen every year since 2008. All the same, operators in both fixed and mobile arenas will continue to be motivated to seek further market consolidation.

form_scope_consolidation_IDATEDIGIWORLD

Given the fragmented market, economies of scale are very low and competition, notably on prices, is extremely intense. Low margins are undermining operators’ capacity to invest in upgrading their infrastructure.

In addition, the lines between fixed and mobile markets are blurring. Much of the traffic generated by mobile devices is channeled through fixed networks, while mobile networks need ever more fibre in the backhaul to handle growing traffic flows. Convergence has also become a commercial reality.

After the European Commission had given its go-ahead to the proposed mobile mergers in Austria, Germany and Ireland, the way seemed clear for further in-market consolidation.

That outlook has changed quite significantly with Margrethe Vestager becoming head of DG Competition: the bar for obtaining approval for in-market transactions seems noticeably higher since. Today, it seems certain the EC will insist on structural measures leading to the entry of a fourth MNO in order to approve a 4-to-3 merger.

EC_merger_decisions_IDATEDIGIWORLD

Even if the road towards more consolidation in the mobile sector was blocked and the potential for fixed-mobile convergence exhausted, it does not follow that the industry structure will stay unchanged. There could be more transactions of limited size, as in the move of the Italian energy group Enel to acquire Metroweb and invest 4 billion EUR in FTTH infrastructure. Cross-border consolidation could be another option. Instead of integrating horizontally, telcos could also focus more on vertical M&A in, for instance, the media sector.

Discover the perspectives,  key trends, and scenarios about "Telecom Consolidation in Europe" & "World Telecom Services Market"and contact Christoph Pennings for further information.

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Remplis sous: Telecom Aucun commentaire
23août/160

TV vs OTT : les nouveaux modèles économiques des contenus sportifs

LEBORGNE-Florence_NB

Florence Le Borgne
Head of the TV & Digital Content Practice, IDATE DigiWorld Contacter

Avec l’explosion du nombre de chaînes TV ces dernières années, l’acquisition de contenus premium est devenue un élément de différenciation fort dans la stratégie des chaînes.

 

Au centre de nombreuses attentions, le sport a connu une croissance spectaculaire des montants investis par les chaînes pour leur diffusion. Si le constat est particulièrement vrai pour les sports majeurs, il s’applique également aux sports secondaires, qui trouvent avec les nouvelles chaînes – généralistes ou sportives – de nouveaux supports d’exposition.

Sport_Content_Evolution_droits_tv_premier_league_royaume_uni_IDATE_DigiWorld

Les grands acteurs ’Internet manifestent depuis plusieurs mois un intérêt croissant pour distribuer des droits sportifs en live sur un territoire donné ou à l’international, que ce soit en faisant directement l’acquisition de droits ou en nouant des partenariats avec des ayants droit. Que ce soit pour augmenter la fréquentation ou pour recruter ou fidéliser des abonnés, YouTube, Yahoo!, Twitter, Facebook ou encore Amazon entendent bien s’imposer à leur tour comme des partenaires incontournables dans la distribution et la valorisation du sport.

Cette concurrence s’ajoute à celles des puissants opérateurs télécoms qui, pour certains, ont engagé une stratégie contenus limitée au sport (Cf. Proximus) ou incluant notamment le sport parmi d’autres contenus (Cf. Altice/SFR). Les moyens engagés par ces acteurs leur ont souvent permis d’accroître leur base d’abonnés IPTV et/ou d’augmenter l’ARPU, mais ont contribué à une inflation sans précédent des droits sportifs qui les rendent de fait de plus en plus difficiles à rentabiliser, surtout dans un univers éclaté entre un nombre de concurrents de plus en plus important.

Face à l’accroissement des coûts de grille de programmes du fait des contenus sportifs, les chaînes de télévision traditionnelles sont condamnées à s’adapter.

• Les chaînes généralistes historiques font le choix de diminuer leurs acquisitions pour se concentrer sur quelques événements phares, et utilisent ces événements coûteux comme une vitrine de leur savoir-faire technologique et de leur capacité à innover.

• Les nouvelles chaînes de télévision ne cherchent pas la concurrence frontale mais optent pour des droits pas ou peu exploités par ailleurs, qui permettent d’acquérir de la notoriété à des coûts compatibles avec leurs contraintes budgétaires.

• L’équation devient de plus en plus complexe pour les grandes chaînes spécialisées, contraintes de surenchérir pour conserver les droits majeurs essentiels à leur notoriété, mais néanmoins victimes de la concurrence et du cord-cutting. Elles voient donc leur nombre d'abonnés diminuer tout en devant faire face à des coûts d’acquisition de programmes en croissance exponentielle. Si la distribution sur Internet (Cf. Sky) et la recherche de partenaires pour la distribution d’une offre sportive complète (Cf. Canal+/beIN Sports) sont des voies de sortie possibles, un des enjeux reste pour elles une renégociation à la baisse de leurs droits.

Si l’OTT va probablement s’imposer à terme comme une solution crédible de distribution de contenus sportifs en live, les enjeux techniques liés à la diffusion d’images requérant un niveau de qualité supérieur à la moyenne demeurent encore importants. Pour le moment encore, la distribution en OTT n’est compétitive économiquement par rapport aux réseaux broadcast (en MPEG-4) que pour des diffusions de quelques milliers d’utilisateurs. Elle reste donc une initiative intéressante pour fournir du contenu de complément et non pour une offre de substitution, notamment sur les sports dits majeurs.

C’est ainsi pour le moment plus essentiellement la voie de la complémentarité entre broadcast et OTT qui s’ouvre pour le moment, en termes :

• de territoires couverts;

• de contenus mis à disposition;

• de capacité à diffuser des sports différents;

• d'enrichissement de l'expérience consommateur.

Sport_content_complementarite_reseaux_modes_acces_IDATE_DigiWorld

 

Pour découvrir nos estimations et le marché des contenus sportifs et l'avenir de la télévision, découvrez notre dernier rapport ou contactez Florence Le Borgne

Pour suivre l’actualité de l’économie numérique, n’oubliez pas de vous inscrire à notre newsletter

29juil/160

Verizon-Yahoo! : de quel challenge parlons-nous ?

Gassot-Yves

Beaucoup d’articles, à partir de détails sur l’histoire de Yahoo! et de ses occasions manquées, ont accompagné l’annonce de l’acquisition de Yahoo! par Verizon (à l’exception de ses brevets et de ses participations dans Alibaba et Yahoo Japan).

 

Verizon permettra-t-il à Yahoo de rebondir ?

La question la plus intéressante que l’on trouve dans ses commentaires est la suivante : Est-ce qu’intégré au groupe Verizon, Yahoo! va rebondir, alors que les changements majeurs de stratégie et de management de la décennie passée n’ont pas réussi à réduire l’écart (croissant) qui le sépare, sur le marché de la publicité, de Google et Facebook ?

Sont mis en avant les technologies dans l’eAdvertising et les contenus découlant de l’acquisition l’année passée d’AOL, et de quelques autres opérations, les accords passés avec les studios et des fédérations sportives ainsi que le lancement d’un service vidéo Go90 orienté vers les mobiles. L’addition de compétences techniques et de contenus peut probablement améliorer la part de marché du nouvel ensemble de quelques points, mais guère au-delà de 4 à 5% du marché de l’eAdvertising et donc très loin des 50% de Google et Facebook cumulés (quelques 70% si l’on se concentre sur l’Internet mobile). Mais d’autres atouts sont avancés pour le futur ensemble : les quelques 115 millions de clients mobiles de Verizon et les quelques 20 millions d’abonnés fixes de l’opérateur.

Quel est la place d’un investissement dans les contenus ou l’eAdvertising dans le business model des opérateurs ?

On bascule là sur un autre challenge qui ne concerne plus tellement le devenir de Yahoo! mais plus généralement l’avenir des telcos. On peut ainsi le présenter : est que les telcos peuvent freiner la tendance à la baisse de leurs revenus par de nouveaux business models impliquant le marché du contenu et celui de la publicité ? Même si Verizon est une des plus belles entreprises des télécommunications du monde avec un taux de marge remarquable, son chiffre d’affaires parait aujourd’hui orienté à la baisse, sous l’effet des coups de boutoirs de la concurrence (T-Mobile), d’un coup de frein dans le renouvellement et le subventionnement des smartphones, et de la suprématie du câble sur le marché fixe grand public.

La concurrence des services et acteurs OTT, souvent avancée, est un argument discutable si l’on considère que le secteur des mobiles était aux Etats-Unis en croissance jusqu’en 2015 bien après l’affirmation du poids des GAFA. Certes Netflix, Amazon ou Hulu peuvent avoir un impact négatif (« cord cutting ») sur les revenus des services fixes, mais il reste limité compte tenu des revenus TV d’un opérateur tel Verizon. En revanche, la créativité et le succès des services OTT, et notamment vidéo, se traduisent par une intensification des usages des accès haut débit mobiles et fixes, des demandes de débits plus élevés et une explosion du trafic. Fondamentalement ce sont là des opportunités de création de valeur pour les telcos même si cela s’accompagne d’un effort continu d’investissement.

Dans le contexte délicat de monétisation de la 4G et de la fibre, les telcos peuvent rechercher des approches complémentaires dans les contenus ou dans la valorisation de leur relation avec leurs clients par la publicité et plus généralement les marchés de la data. On peut étayer cette hypothèse par les opérations successives de Verizon précitées mais aussi par l’acquisition beaucoup plus conséquente d’AT&T qui a intégré l’année dernière le deuxième opérateur de payTV du pays, DirecTV[1], et plus proche de nous par les investissements conséquents de BT, Telefonica ou SFR dans les droits sportifs.

Où sont les atouts des telcos ?

On a tendance à mettre en avant le pipe, autrement dit l’infrastructure technique d’acheminement des programmes chez le consommateur. Cet argument nous semble devoir être relativisé à un moment où la concurrence dans les accès a tendance à devenir effective et où s’installe la Net Neutralité[2]. Les atouts des telcos paraissent toutefois plus crédibles sur trois points :

• D’abord, s’ils sont gros et disposent de plusieurs dizaines de millions de clients, ils peuvent rivaliser avec les groupes de télévision traditionnels pour acquérir des droits et des exclusivités en amortissant les sommes engagées sur leurs abonnés. En fait la rationalité économique des investissements réalisés dans les contenus est également facilitée par la capacité à imputer une partie de ces charges sur les frais marketing si des gains d’images et surtout une progression dans les parts de marchés sont attendus sur leurs activités traditionnelles[3]. On fera cependant remarquer que sous cet angle –économie d’échelle- les purs OTT qui sont pour les plus puissants présents sur une grosse partie des marchés de la planète, ont encore un avantage sur les telcos. Netflix a ainsi dépassé 70 millions d’abonnés dans plus de 190 pays et annonce investir cette année $5 milliards dans les contenus. De notre point de vue, la tendance principale est là : une globalisation de la distribution des contenus qui s’affranchit des contraintes d’intermédiation des groupes nationaux de télévision, des cablo-opérateurs ou des telcos.

• Le deuxième argument réside dans la relation des telcos avec leurs abonnés, leur réseau commercial (les boutiques en particulier), la qualité de l’écosystème qu’ils offrent à travers les interfaces utilisateurs et leurs boxes, et naturellement les données qui potentiellement leur donnent une connaissance assez précise du profil de leurs clients. Pour illustrer les choses, on pourrait dire que même si Netflix n’a pas besoin d’être référencé dans l’interface des telcos pour exister sur un marché national, cela peut l’aider.

• Le troisième atout des telcos repose sur le recueil de données associé à cette relation avec le client. C’est un pouvoir de prescription et un potentiel de valorisation direct ou indirect sur le marché de la publicité programmatique. L’avantage est clair vis-à-vis des groupes de télévision qui schématiquement souffrent d’une absence de voie de retour leur permettant de cibler les consommateurs. Il l’est moins vis-à-vis des OTT qui ont su développer des modèles générant des données pertinentes sur les consommateurs. Il reste aussi à démontrer que le potentiel de valorisation des données des telcos passe principalement par un investissement dans les contenus. Google ou Facebook ne se présente pas comme des entreprises de media.

Les stratégies différentes des telcos.

En résumé, si les telcos veulent compléter les efforts de segmentation et différenciation pour monétiser leurs services d’accès par des revenus substantiels liés aux contenus, il faut qu’ils soient gros (et cela peut être aussi vu comme un argument pour des opérations de consolidation cross-market) pour supporter la globalisation en cours du marché des droits audiovisuels. Au-delà de leur implication dans les contenus, les telcos ont encore largement leur preuve à faire pour montrer qu’ils peuvent sérieusement disputer le leadership de Google et de Facebook sur le marché de l’eAdvertising… sans perdre le statut de tiers de confiance de leurs abonnés.

Dans ce contexte, il est clair que les stratégies des telcos sont assez différentes. Verizon s’est clairement engagé dans une opération à moyen terme qui se distingue en cela de l’opération AT&T-DirecTV qui table sur des synergies commerciales et financières rapides, ou des investissements dans les contenus des opérateurs européens (BT, SFR) qui cherchent principalement à disposer d’un élément de différenciation vis-à-vis de leurs pairs.

[1] Les stratégies d’AT&T et de Verizon mériteraient cependant une étude comparée car elles se distinguent par de nombreux aspects. Une remarque toutefois s’applique aux deux opérateurs : la croissance sur le marché US d’AT&T comme de Verizon ne peut pas se traduire par des opérations de consolidation dans les mobiles compte tenu de l’opposition de l’antitrust.

[2] Certes, le débat n’est pas terminé et il n’est pas encore aisé d’interpréter les exceptions au titre des services spéciaux ou d’anticiper le sort qui sera fait aux contenus offerts en « zero rating »…

[3] On pense en particulier à BT qui a investi lourdement dans les droits sportifs mais en a tiré une progression très significative de sa part de marché sur le haut et très haut débit.

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26juil/162

Le marché mondial du jeu vidéo (marché des équipements compris) atteindra 107 milliards EUR en 2020

MICHAUD-Laurent1

Laurent Michaud Responsable de la practice Digital Home & Entertainment

Cette dynamique s'explique principalement par la progression régulière des segments du jeu mobile, du jeu en ligne et d'une nouvelle catégorie, la réalité virtuelle (VR).

 

Répartition du marché mondial du jeu vidéo par segment, 2016 et 2020

world_video_game_market

Les segments traditionnels du jeu dépassés par la concurrence du jeu en ligne et du jeu sur plateformes nomades

Les segments traditionnels du jeu vidéo perdent rapidement en influence

Le jeu sur consoles de salon représente 41% du marché total en 2016 et devrait progressivement diminuer jusqu'en 2020, une part bien en deçà de celle de 2008, lors de la phase de déploiement de la précédente génération (78%).
Par ailleurs, le jeu sur consoles portables poursuivra quant à lui sa croissance jusqu'en 2020. Quant au jeu hors-ligne sur ordinateur individuel, il poursuit son déclin.

...Conséquence du succès important des segments du jeu en ligne sur ordinateur et du jeu nomade

La part du jeu en ligne sur ordinateur est en léger déclin, et représentera moins de 20% de l'ensemble du marché du jeu vidéo en 2020.
Cette progression rapide des tablettes s'explique par l'enrichissement de l'expérience ludique grâce à un écran tactile bien plus large que celui des smartphones.
Aussi, la part de la réalité virtuelle (VR) va progresser rapidement pour atteindre 18% du marché du jeu vidéo en 2020.

Une concurrence en termes de "budget-temps"

Si les expériences ludiques des différents segments de marché sont différentes, les joueurs bénéficient d'un budget temps plafonné. Ils sont donc amenés à choisir une plateforme plutôt qu'une autre en fonction de leurs envies ou de leur situation.

Plus de 70% des revenus du marché du jeu vidéo en 2016 sont issus de la dématérialisation de la distribution et des pratiques payantes en ligne

En 2016, 71% des revenus du marché du jeu vidéo devrait provenir de la vente dématérialisée (sur smartphones, ordinateurs connectés, consoles de salon et portables connectés) et des pratiques payantes en ligne (item selling, abonnements, commissions sur opérations de change). En 2020, cette part devrait s'élever à près de 89%.

Le marché du logiciel de jeux dématérialisés affichera une croissance annuelle moyenne de 12.8% entre 2016 et 2020, alors que la valeur du marché du logiciel de jeux physiques devrait très légèrement baisser.

Tous les segments sont donc concernés : les consoles de salon comme les consoles portables sont elles aussi irrémédiablement engagées sur la voie de la dématérialisation.

 

Découvrez-en plus sur le marché du jeu video dans notre rapport dédié

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Remplis sous: Video Games 2 Commentaires
25juil/160

Interview with Martin FRANSMAN : the Innovation Ecosystem

DWEJ102_FRANSMAN

"Mobile dynamics: the path to 5G"
DigiWorld Economic Journal n°102

Interview with Martin FRANSMAN
Professor of economics, Founder-director of the Institute for Japanese-European Technology Studies, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdo

Conducted by Anders HENTEN Aalborg University, Balllerup, Denmark

 

More information on DigiWorld Economic Journal No. 102 "What do you really mean by 5G from a technology perspective? on our website

 

DW Economic Journal: What do you mean by an "Innovation Ecosystem"?

Martin FRANSMAN: By an "Innovation Ecosystem" I mean a group of players who through their symbiotic interactions (both cooperative and competitive) make innovation happen and, by so doing, coevolve over time.

How may the idea of an Innovation Ecosystem be applied?

The key point to bear in mind is that an "Innovation Ecosystem" is not an observable object. Rather it is a conceptual construct which serves a particular purpose. This important point requires some elaboration.

As Edith PENROSE has pointed out, "a "firm is by no means an unambiguous clear-cut entity; it is not an observable object physically separable from other objects, and it is difficult to define except with reference to what it does or what is done within it". She goes on to observe that "Herein lies a potential source of confusion" [1]. The same is true of an "Innovation Ecosystem".

This becomes clear in reflecting on my definition of an Innovation Ecosystem as a group of players who make innovation happen. This raises the question of which players should be included in the ecosystem and which excluded. This is the question of the appropriate boundary of the Innovation Ecosystem being conceived. How far "back" is it necessary to go in conceiving of an Innovation Ecosystem?

If we are using the concept of Innovation Ecosystems to understand how innovation happens in the Mobile Telecommunications sector, for example, where should this boundary be drawn? It may be readily agreed that players such as final consumers, telecoms operators, telecoms equipment suppliers, and regulators should be included in the ecosystem. And for some purposes this definition may suffice. However, if the purpose is to understand the main determinants of the innovation process in this sector the net should obviously be considerably widened to include, for instance, universities and government research institutes who not only do relevant research but also provide important training. Other players may also merit inclusion in order to achieve the purpose.

This example makes it clear that an appropriate conceptualisation of an Innovation Ecosystem depends on the purposes and questions asked in the investigation. But complications may go even further than this. For example, even if different analysts can agree on the purposes and questions they may differ regarding which players should necessarily be included.

In view of problems such as these it is necessary to exercise more caution than is usually done in defining an innovation ecosystem. At the very least it is important to make explicitly clear the purposes and questions that are being pursued as well as the reasons for particular boundary decisions.

What in your view is the difference between an "Innovation System" and an "Innovation Ecosystem" and why did you choose to use the latter concept in your work?

The literature on innovation in this area tends to fall into two groups. The Innovation System Group, which is more homogeneous, is made up primarily of heterodox economists such as Chris FREEMAN, Dick NELSON and Stan METCALFE. They all acknowledge intellectual inspiration from the work of Joseph SCHUMPETER. Having originally trained as economists they all came to believe that the various approaches to economic growth adopted by mainstream economics do not provide a sufficiently robust explanation of how economic growth happens and why different countries often exhibit different growth patterns. They also share a common belief that innovation is the most important driver of economic growth and that mainstream economics does not have an adequate understanding of how innovation happens and who makes it happen. The concept of an "Innovation System", originally proposed by Chris FREEMAN in his book on Japan [2], is put forward as an alternative way of explaining growth. Central to this concept, and explicit in their definitions of "innovation system", is the role played by institutions understood not only in the Douglass NORTH sense of rules of the game but also as non-firm determinants that help (and perhaps hinder) innovation and therefore economic growth.

The Innovation Ecosystem literature, in contrast, is far more heterogeneous. It tends to come from scholars with a background in business studies. A notable example is the iconic book by IANSITI & LEVIEN from Harvard Business School, The Keystone Advantage: what the new dynamics of business ecosystems mean for strategy, innovation, and sustainability. A central concern in this literature is the cooperative networks created by complementary businesses which both individually and jointly create value for customers. The common belief (whether tacit or explicit) is that the truth lies in the constellation of businesses, rather than in individual businesses taken alone. This has important implications for dealing with topics such as business strategy and sustainability.

In contrast, my own use of the terms "ecosystem" and "innovation ecosystem" is inspired not so much by business behaviour as by the example of biological ecosystems with their populations of interacting organisms and species. As Alfred MARSHALL, the nineteenth century economist said, "The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics" [3]. This analogy, however, should not be pushed too far and I insist that the basic unit that makes up the "players" in my ecosystem are purposive and conscious individuals whose decisions and actions imply necessary complications such as beliefs, mistakes, and expectations which are not pre-determined in any meaningful sense of this word. Whilst there is significant overlap between my "ecosystem" and the concepts of Innovation System and Innovation Ecosystem perhaps the main difference is the emphasis I give to the dilemmas involved in interacting individuals, albeit in populations, understanding and acting in the uncertain world that is ours.

Can the concept of Innovation Ecosystem contribute to our understanding of leadership in an area such as mobile telecommunications?

The first problem in answering this question is to agree on what should be understood in this context by "leadership". Both countries and companies may lead, the former, for example, in performance of infrastructure and services, and the latter, for instance, in terms of indicators such as revenue growth, market capitalisation, and market share.

Having agreed on who leads the next problem is to explain why this leader has been able to lead. It is here that the concept of an Innovation Ecosystem as defined earlier potentially becomes useful. Let us take several examples to illustrate.

The first example is the lead by "Europe" in 2G mobile. Not only were the main European telecoms operators able to introduce world-leading 2G mobile infrastructure and services, the key European mobile equipment providers, notably Ericsson and Nokia, were able to become globally dominant players. Why did this happen?

Whilst the answer to this question clearly necessitates that we understand the strengths (and also weaknesses) of these two groups of company players there were other important determinants without which their global leadership would have been, if not impossible, then far less likely. These include, notably, the prior establishment of an agreed Nordic mobile set of standards and systems initially meant to facilitate inter-country mobile communications within the Nordic region as well as the establishment and functioning of a set of European institutions that enabled the emergence of GSM standards. These events required the interventions of other players, including policy-makers, regulators, and researchers. By following this kind of reasoning we will be able to identify both the relevant players and the ecosystem of symbiotic interactions that facilitated the eventual global success of GSM.

The second example is the remarkable rise of Huawei as a leading player not only in telecoms equipment but also, more recently, in smartphones. Once again, a key part of the explanation must involve an account of the emerging capability inside this company to successfully innovate. This success was dramatically illustrated by the successful entry of this company as a supplier to some of Europe's major telecoms operators in the face of very strong and long-standing competition from the key European telecoms equipment providers. Crucially, this entry depended not only on a Chinese comparative advantage-based cost benefit but also on the ability of Huawei to address some of the important problems expressed by the operators.

But reflection soon reveals that there is more to this success story than only what happened within Huawei. Also significant was Huawei's membership of the Chinese Innovation Ecosystem. Although at first a Chinese outsider that depended as much on other emerging countries as it did on the poorer Chinese regions for sale of its equipment, Huawei, with adept leadership, soon developed sufficiently strong capabilities to become a domestic supplier of growing importance able to both contribute to and benefit from the rapid growth of China and its telecoms infrastructure. Fleshing this story out requires an account of the key players (including, for instance, Chinese universities and other organisations) in the Chinese Innovation Ecosystem whose interactions made important contributions.

The third example is the central role of the US in smartphone developments. Here too a discussion is needed of the key telecoms operators and equipment providers as well as other important players such as policy-makers, regulators, university and other research organisations. But also of crucial importance is the direction taken by the evolution of the mobile telecoms sector itself. More specifically it is also important to understand the convergence of the mobile telephone and the computing subsectors that, until the advent of the smartphone with its own operating system, were largely distinct. This convergence gave a huge opportunity to the US that had always dominated the field of computing from its origins. Once the phone became in effect a computer that added many other functionalities US players, incumbents and new entrants, were able to leverage the superior computing capabilities that they and their ecosystem possessed in this area.  This was also a significant contributor to US dominance.

As these three examples illustrate, the idea of Innovation Ecosystems can make a significant contribution to our ability to understand and explain these cases of leadership. However, the conceptual caveats mentioned in the answer to the first question must be kept in mind in deploying this idea.

Does the idea of Innovation Ecosystems have any positive implications for a European attempt to regain global leadership in the field of mobile telecommunications?

We must be careful not to slip into the voluntaristic error, i.e. "create the correct Innovation Ecosystem and all will be well!". The reason is that there are always some given constraints that remain binding. Examples are the historically inherited stock of capabilities, whether one's own or those of competitors; the given institutional framework; etc. One apposite example is the demise of Nokia as one of the global mobile industry's foremost pioneers and leaders.

From my personal discussions with some of Nokia's most important leaders I have no doubt that in its last years the company and its key decision-makers had an excellent understanding of what here is called the idea of an Innovation Ecosystem. Indeed, many of the company's key documents, both private and public, were formulated using the terminology of Innovation Ecosystems. There is every reason to suppose that this made both thinking and strategy formulation in Nokia better than it would have been without these conceptualisations.

However, the fact of the matter, sadly and regretfully, was that Nokia was significantly constrained by its historical path-dependence. More specifically, the company was substantially impeded by the Symbian operating system that it had inherited from the pre-computerised smartphone past. Not only did this operating system have defects from the point of view of application development, a key requirement for competitiveness, relative to the operating systems of the main competitors it suffered important shortcomings. No amount of perceptive Ecosystems thinking could, in the time required by competition, suffice to stay the company's threat of execution at the hands of unforgiving market forces. The same goes for the company's new leaders brought in to try and stay this execution.

The Nokia example has important implications for policy-making that uses the concept of Innovation Ecosystems. The main lesson, to repeat, is to avoid voluntaristic errors by coming to better understand what can, and what cannot, be changed by purposeful action.

How useful is the idea of Company Innovation Ecosystems?

Paradoxically, very little scholarly work has been done on how innovation happens, and who makes it happen, within purposefully created Company Innovation Ecosystems. Even the book by IANSITI & LEVIEN referred to earlier, despite the word "innovation" in its subtitle, does not delve into these questions, preferring to devote only a little attention to the incentive to create organisational innovation that benefits the business network/ecosystem as a whole. Accordingly, these questions unfortunately remain unaddressed.

The "open innovation" literature does not do justice to these questions either. Although the issue of innovation players outside the focal firm is explicitly addressed the questions of how all the players in the company's Innovation Ecosystem make innovation happen and who can and should make it happen are not discussed. Yet these questions are crucial for any company or other organisation wanting to improve performance through innovation.

What kind of guidance can be given to the leaders of companies who would like to make use of the idea of Company Innovation Ecosystems in order to improve their performance? This question is currently occupying a good deal of my attention.

 


[1] PENROSE, E. T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Basil BLACKWELL, Oxford, p. 10.
[2] FREEMAN, C. (1987), Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, PINTER, London.
[3] MARSHALL, A. (1962), Principles of Economics, Macmillan, London, p. xii.Martin FRANSMAN is Professor of Economics in the School of Economics at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of numerous books and articles including The New ICT Ecosystem: Implications for Policy and Regulation (Cambridge University Press) which won the Joseph Schumpeter Prize.

 More information on DigiWorld Economic Journal No. 102 "What do you really mean by 5G from a technology perspective? on our website

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20juil/160

Où en est l’Europe dans le déploiement du très haut débit ?

Gassot-Yves

Yves Gassot,
Directeur général, IDATE DigiWorld

Une récente étude IDATE DigiWorld souligne globalement le retard des marchés européens dans l’atteinte des objectifs l’Agenda Numérique pour le très haut débit (50% des foyers connectés en 2020 doivent l’être à travers des accès à plus de 100Mbps).

A l’occasion des 10èmes Assises du Très Haut Débit (Aromates-IDATE DigiWorld) qui se sont tenues le 6 juillet à Paris, nous avons présenté en avant-première les chiffres de couverture des pays européens à fin 2015 en s’appuyant sur nos bases de données FTTx,les dernières informations collectées auprès des régulateurs et des opérateurs, ainsi que sur une étude que nous venons de publier sur le thème « Digital Agenda in Europe : a snapshot ».

Classement des pays européens très haut débit : taux de couverture NGA à 30 et 100 Mbps (à décembre 2015)
schema_Europe_THD
Source : IDATE DigiWorld: Digital Agenda Europe, juillet 2016

La situation est donc contrastée et pour de nombreux pays l’objectif sera difficile à atteindre sans que des mesures importantes soient mises en œuvre. Les pays les plus en avance profitent d’une large présence de réseaux câblés, et du choix par l’incumbent d’options techniques moins radicales que le déploiement de la fibre jusqu’à chez l’abonné (FTTH). La Belgique par exemple combine une large couverture par des réseaux câblés mis à niveau avec les technologies Docsis (>100Mps) et le choix par le principal opérateur télécom d’accès très haut débit en cuivre VDSL (>30Mps).

Les grands pays sont globalement moins bien placés pour atteindre les objectifs de l’Agenda Numérique. Ainsi en France, l’option prioritaire donnée à  la fibre (FTTH), la couverture  relativement limitée des réseaux câblés (40% des foyers), et le démarrage très progressif des projets en zone de faible densité –couvrant plus de 40% des prises à terme- basés sur des investissements Publics/Privés,  se sont traduits par un positionnement en queue de peloton tant en terme de prises commercialisables très haut débit que de vitesse moyenne d’accès à l’Internet. La situation est plus favorable pour  le Royaume Uni et l’Allemagne qui ont vu BT et DT déployer rapidement des offres VDSL (>30Mbps) en réaction à la concurrence agressive du câble. L’Espagne qui combine des investissements en FTTH et dans le câble occupe aussi une place plus favorable dans ces classements. Seule l’Italie qui a vu son opérateur historique tarder à investir de façon significative dans le FTTH et n’a pas pu s’appuyer sur des infrastructures de câble, fait moins bien que la France.

L’étude IDATE DigiWorld montre que lorsque les réseaux à Très Haut Débit sont là, les clients répondent présents. Les taux d’abonnement sont ainsi largement supérieurs dans les zones équipées en accès  Ultra Haut Débit (100 Mbps et plus). On peut dès lors tabler sur un processus de différenciation vertueux encourageant les investissements dans la montée en débit avec la perspective de voir non pas une hausse systématique des tarifs d’accès à l’Internet mais des options correspondant aux différents besoins.

On ne peut toutefois dans cette perspective sous-estimer la complexité de la tâche du régulateur jusqu’alors définie par le règlement européen relatif au dégroupage de la boucle locale en cuivre.  Le retrait de l’ADSL au profit du  VDSL (avec Vectoring/Bonding et Gfast)  comme le FTTH semblent jouer naturellement à l’avantage de l’incumbent, laissant ce dernier en duopole avec le câble.  Ce schéma toutefois est beaucoup trop grossier si l’on prend en compte (en observant notamment le cadre réglementaire français)  le potentiel de duplication des infrastructures à très haut débit dans les zones denses, l’intérêt pour des opérations de partage des investissements dans les zones de moyennes densité,  le rôle des investissements publics/privés en zones de faible densité et naturellement les promesses du très haut débit mobile.

Bel été pour tous nos lecteurs !

Retrouvez nos analyses sur le très haut débit en Europe en commandant nos études :

Digital Agenda in Europe : a snapshot
World FTTx market : Markets at December 2015 & Forecasts to 2020

Par ailleurs, découvrez les dernières études IDATE DigiWorld :

Industrial Internet: toward the 4th industrial revolution
World OTT Markets: Markets & Forecasts up to 2020
Content Economics: How digital distribution is impacting content industries?

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19juil/160

Mobile payment: M-commerce market revenue will likely grow from 2015 to 2019 at a CAGR of 26.5%

Hao_Yi

Hao Yi Emerging technologies expert, IDATE DigiWorld

The development of the mobile payment market was still heterogeneous in 2015.

 

 

The m-commerce payment market grew steadily, whereas the in-store mobile payment market remained nascent given the transaction volume, although the release of Apple Pay one year earlier had seemingly put an end to the doubts about near field communication (NFC) being the right technology for in-store proximity payment.

MCommerce_revenues_annual_growth_rate_eCommerce_v2

IDATE DigiWorld estimates that the worldwide m-commerce market revenue will likely grow from 2015 to 2019 at a CAGR of 26.5%, growing its share 26% of the overall value of the e-commerce market to 44.2%. As regards the arrival of in-store mobile payments with NFC technology, QR code, mobile wallets, mobile point-of-sale (mPOS) solutions and other mobile payment methods, IDATE DigiWorld values their transaction volume to grow at a CAGR of 74% between 2015 and 2019. The volume of in-store mobile payments is tiny compared to the trillions of USD of all point-of-sale (POS) transactions.

On the in-store payment market, no one has really ‘wined out’ as yet, although Internet giants (Apple, Google and Samsung) as well as card networks (Visa and MasterCard) are very active, and numerous new entrants are flooding in.

In addition, NFC payment working with mobile wallets did not see the expected explosion in volume. Even though the technology and NFC-enabled POS terminals have been progressively in place for many years, the perceived value of such services is low for consumers.

From the perspective of merchants, mobile payment alone is not enough to bring about mass adoption.

Find out more about this market in our dedicated report

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